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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equal-
ity (“Korematsu Center”), based at Seattle University 
School of Law, advances justice through research, ad-
vocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center studies 
the racial disproportionality that exists within our 
criminal justice system, and has filed and helped re-
search several briefs relating to youth sentencing in 
state appellate courts. The Korematsu Center does not, 
in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views 
of Seattle University. 
 Nationally, the Phillips Black Project has been at 
the forefront of understanding and chronicling, via le-
gal scholarship, the administration and transfor-
mation of juvenile life without parole sentencing 
practices after Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), 
and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). In Mis-
souri, Phillips Black has investigated the administra-
tion of parole practices of the Missouri Department of 
Corrections, by collecting and analyzing data on parole 
hearings, conducting interviews with advocates who 
regularly appear before the parole board, and through 
direct experience appearing before the board.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution in-
tended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No per-
son other than the amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. The requirements 
of Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a) have been met, with timely notice 
given and the amicus brief accompanied by written consent to file 
granted by counsel of record for petitioner and respondent. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Miller v. Alabama gave hope to youth offenders 
sentenced to unconstitutionally long sentences that 
they might experience freedom instead of dying in 
prison. Miller’s promise was twofold: first, that individ-
ualized sentencing proceedings would account for their 
diminished culpability, and second, that a mechanism 
such as parole would provide a meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release. In many states, including Missouri, 
this promise has been illusory.  
 Mr. Williams’s sentence, as well as the sentences 
of four other petitioners whose certiorari petitions 
were filed contemporaneously,2 imposed prior to Miller, 
were mandatory sentences of life without parole. Mis-
souri’s current parole process, enacted on the heels of 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, will not provide Mr. Wil-
liams with either an individualized sentencing pro-
ceeding or a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 
Instead, Mr. Williams will receive an ill-defined, and 
perhaps single, opportunity to petition the parole 
board for release after serving twenty-five years. Mis-
souri’s parole process lacks basic procedural guaran-
tees, predictably leading to few instances of reprieve 
from the board. 
 Missouri is not alone its failure to provide Miller’s 
guarantees. Virginia claims that geriatric release pro-
visions, which permit the possibility of release after an 
 
 2 Brown v. Bowersox, No. 16-6474; Clerk v. Cassady, No. 16-




inmate reaches the age of 60, provide a meaningful op-
portunity to obtain release. North Carolina provides 
neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard in its pa-
role process. Maryland, in the last two decades, has 
never granted parole to a juvenile offender sentenced 
to life. 
 This case presents an opportunity to ensure Mil-
ler’s requirement that children have a meaningful op-
portunity for release by stopping states from giving lip 
service to Miller through inadequate parole processes. 
In the alternative, this Court should grant Mr. Wil-
liams’s petition, vacate the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
dismissal, and remand the case to the Missouri courts 
to consider in the first instance whether Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 558.047.1(1) (2016) in fact provides a meaningful op-
portunity for release for juvenile offenders who have 
received unconstitutionally long sentences, as man-
dated by this Court in Graham, Miller, and Montgom-
ery. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO RECTIFY SEVERAL STATES’ REFUS-
ALS TO FOLLOW MILLER.  
 This Court has not yet addressed the scope of the 
requirement of individualized consideration in a juve-
nile sentencing proceeding. Likewise, it has yet to ad-
dress a related question it initially left to the states: 
what constitutes a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
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release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabili-
tation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Without this Court’s 
guidance, several states’ appellate courts have ren-
dered Miller meaningless by holding that (1) Miller 
does not apply if the sentencing court had any modi-
cum of discretion; (2) Miller has been satisfied if any 
aspect of youth was considered by the sentencing court; 
or (3) Miller is satisfied by the mere existence of the 
possibility for release by parole, without any consider-
ation of whether that state’s parole system provides a 
meaningful opportunity for release based on its proce-
dures or as evidenced by results. This Court could, as 
it did in Tatum v. Arizona, 580 U.S. ___, No. 15-8850, 
2016 WL 1381849 (Oct. 31, 2016), fix this on a petition-
by-petition and state-by-state basis through Grant-Va-
cate-Remand (GVR) orders. However, amici urge this 
Court to provide guidance to states regarding both 
what individualized consideration requires as well as 
what constitutes a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release. 
 
A. Miller Requires an Individualized Con-
sideration of Youth and a Meaningful 
Opportunity to Obtain Release. 
 In Graham v. Florida, this Court recognized the 
final condemnation that a life without parole sentence 
imposes: it forever denies an inmate “a chance to 
demonstrate growth and maturity.” 560 U.S. at 73. 
When imposed on a juvenile offender, such a sentence 
requires the heightened need for reliability typically 
reserved for capital cases. For this reason, in 2012, the 
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Court prohibited all mandatory sentences of life with-
out parole for juvenile offenses. Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). Before imposing “the harshest 
penalties” on juveniles, a court must provide individu-
alized consideration of the juvenile, including the in-
fluence of age on the juvenile’s culpability and 
prospects for rehabilitation.3 Id. Even after such con-
sideration, before imposing a life without parole sen-
tence, a court must find that the juvenile is one of 
“those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable 
corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 599, 
734 (2016).  
 Individualized consideration of a juvenile’s age is 
required because, if “youth (and all that accompanies 
it) [is] irrelevant to that harsh sentence, such a scheme 
poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The risk of disproportional-
ity flows from the inherently mitigated culpability of 
juvenile offenders and the uniquely long incarceration 
that follows from sentencing a juvenile to death in 
prison. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70. The Court explained 
that “youth matters for purposes of meting out the 
law’s most serious punishments,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2471, and that “the distinctive attributes of youth di-
minish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,” id. at 2465; 
see also id. at 2464-66, 2468-71. 
 
 3 The Chief Justice has noted that the principle underlying 
Miller’s requirement of individualized consideration should apply 




 No Missouri court has given individualized consid-
eration of the required Miller factors to Mr. Williams. 
After Montgomery conclusively determined that Miller 
was retroactively applicable to sentences such as Mr. 
Williams’s, Missouri enacted a law that made Mr. Wil-
liams eligible for parole.4 The Missouri Supreme Court 
then summarily dismissed Mr. Williams’s request for 
resentencing in light of Miller and Montgomery. See 
Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 7. Because Mr. Williams’s sen-
tence is still not the product of an individualized con-
sideration of his youth, his petition presents the Court 
with an opportunity to clarify the scope of the individ-
ualized consideration requirement. 
 Even if this Court construes Missouri’s statutory 
response to Miller as a resentencing, it is still a man-
datory sentence. That is, there is a single option for 
persons such as Mr. Williams: an opportunity to peti-
tion for parole after twenty-five years. As a mandatory 
sentence, it must provide Mr. Williams with a “mean-
ingful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
strated maturity and rehabilitation.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2469 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). This Court, 
in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983), expressed 
its understanding of parole as being a “regular part of 
the rehabilitative process” and, “[a]ssuming good be-
havior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority 
of cases.” But as we demonstrate below, several states’ 
 
 4 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.047.1(1) (2016) (youth serving life with-
out parole sentences who were “under eighteen years of age at the 
time of the commission of the offense . . . may submit to the parole 
board a petition for a review of his sentence”). 
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parole systems, including Missouri’s, do not in fact pro-
vide a meaningful opportunity for release. 
 
B. Some States Are Not Ensuring Individ-
ualized Consideration of Miller Fac-
tors. 
 Some jurisdictions have determined that as long 
as courts have any modicum of discretion when sen-
tencing a person for a crime committed as a juvenile, 
Miller does not apply. A typical example of this is the 
approach taken by the Virginia Supreme Court when 
it found that Miller does not apply to Virginia’s sen-
tencing scheme because a trial court always has the 
ability to “suspend imposition of [a] sentence or sus-
pend the sentence in whole or part.” Jones v. Common-
wealth, 763 S.E.2d 823, 825 (Va. 2014).5  
 Other jurisdictions continue to struggle to imple-
ment Miller and Montgomery fully, insisting that if an 
offender’s youth was considered during sentencing at 
all, Miller is satisfied – even with no formal, individu-
alized consideration of the juvenile or finding of irrep-
arable corruption. See, e.g., Tatum, 2016 WL 1381849, 
at *2 (a court’s individualized consideration of the mit-
igating factors of youth must determine whether a par-
ticular offender is a child “ ‘whose crimes reflect 
 
 5 Though this Court issued a GVR order on Jones’s petition 
for certiorari, Jones v. Virginia, 136 S. Ct. 1358 (2016), the order 
speaks only to the question of Miller’s retroactivity. Id. (“Court’s 
disposition does not . . . address . . . whether petitioner’s sentence 
actually qualifies as a mandatory life without parole sentence”). 
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transient immaturity’ or is one of ‘those rare children 
whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption’ for whom 
a life without parole sentence may be appropriate.” 
(quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734)).  
 
C. Litigation Concerning the Adequacy of 
Parole Programs under Miller Demon-
strates that States Need Guidance. 
 States that are attempting to remedy Miller viola-
tions through meaningful opportunity for release ra-
ther than resentencing face substantial uncertainty as 
to what a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” 
actually requires. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). There is recent and pending 
litigation in several states to determine whether these 
jurisdictions’ parole schemes provide the meaningful 
opportunity for release required by Miller.6 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that Flor-
ida’s parole system was entirely ill-suited to provide 
 
 6 See, e.g., Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2016) (direct-
ing district court to address appropriateness of Michigan’s parole 
system under Montgomery and Miller); Greiman v. Hodges, 79 
F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (denying motion to dismiss 
whether Iowa’s parole system provided juvenile offender a mean-
ingful opportunity for release); Complaint at ¶ 10, Md. Restorative 
Justice Initiative v. Hogan, 316 F.R.D. 106 (D. Md. 2016) (No. 1:16-
cv-01021-ELH), 2016 WL 1403172 (alleging that Maryland’s pa-
role scheme “functions as a system of ad hoc executive clemency 
in which grants of release are exceptionally rare, are governed by 
no substantive, enforceable standards, and are masked from view 
by blanket assertions of executive privilege”).  
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the meaningful opportunity for release to those juve-
niles serving life with possibility of parole, which made 
that sentence “virtually indistinguishable from a sen-
tence of life without parole.” Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 
1040, 1041 (Fla. 2016). Because Florida’s parole sys-
tem did not comport with Miller, the court ordered re-
sentencing. 
 Although this Court has not explicated its own 
views on what constitutes a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release, at minimum it has counseled that some 
type of hearing must analyze an offender’s particular-
ized circumstances, with the presumption against life-
time imprisonment. A meaningful opportunity for 
review should consist of: (1) “a chance of release at a 
meaningful point in time”; (2) a realistic likelihood of 
release for the rehabilitated; and (3) a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard. Sarah French Russell, Review 
for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, 
and the Eighth Amendment, 89 Ind. L. J. 373, 375-76 
(2014). 
 In the context of this case, Mr. Williams and the 
other four petitioners will not have the Miller factors 
applied in their cases, and therefore will be provided 
neither an individualized determination of mitigation 
nor a meaningful opportunity for release. Further, be-
cause he is not entitled to resentencing under Mis-




 Although this Court could proceed on a petition-
by-petition and state-by-state basis to issue GVR or-
ders, judicial efficiency and the liberty interests of ju-
venile “lifers” to not be subject to constitutionally 
inadequate and infirm parole processes strongly sup-
port the grant of certiorari on this petition, as well as 
the petitions of Messrs. Brown, Clerk, Evans-Bey, and 
McElroy. 
 
II. MISSOURI AND A HANDFUL OF OUTLIER 
STATES USE SHAM PAROLE PROCESSES 
TO SIDESTEP THE REQUIREMENT OF A 
MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO OB-
TAIN RELEASE.  
 Because the Court has not yet explained what pro-
tections Graham, Miller, and their progeny require, it 
remains unclear which procedural protections consti-
tute a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Gra-
ham, 560 U.S. at 75. Likewise, it remains unclear 
whether such an opportunity is foreclosed where pa-
role is granted only rarely. Some states are apparently 
flouting this requirement by providing limited proce-
dural guarantees in parole and a corresponding low 
probability of release. For those inmates whose Miller-
violative sentences were only “cured” by operation of 
newly found eligibility for parole review, the lack of 
guidance from this Court, together with sham parole 
11 
 
processes, will keep Miller’s promise out of reach.7 This 
is especially the case for Mr. Williams and other simi-
larly situated persons because there is no constitution-
ally protected right to parole, unless release is vested 
by statute, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb., 442 U.S. 1, 7 
(1979), and the Missouri Supreme Court has been clear 
that Missouri parole statutes create no protected lib-
erty interest whatsoever, “giving the [Parole] Board al-
most unlimited discretion in whether to grant parole 
release,” Cavallero v. Groose, 908 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Mo. 
1995) (quotation omitted). 
 Parole processes vary dramatically by jurisdiction, 
but a handful of states, including Missouri, provide lit-
tle opportunity for release. Virginia has maintained 
that its geriatric release program provided juvenile of-
fenders a meaningful opportunity for release, even 
though the considerations for release under that pro-
gram bear no resemblance to the considerations re-
quired by Miller. See LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 15-7151, 
2016 WL 6652438 at *8-11 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2016) (re-
versing state-court determination that geriatric re-
lease provision satisfied Graham because provision did 
 
 7 This Court should accept review now because of the very 
limited review available of state convictions in federal court fol-
lowing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (no federal habeas corpus jurisdiction unless 
decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States”). Although amici maintain Missouri’s 
procedure would be reviewable in federal court under this provi-




not require consideration of demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation; did not provide for a meaningful op-
portunity for release; and did not take into considera-
tion the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders). North 
Carolina offenders receive no notice of when their pa-
role decision will be made and receive no opportunity 
to present evidence in support of parole. Hayden v. But-
ler, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1002 (E.D. N.C. 2015).  
 In Maryland, a requirement that the governor ex-
plicitly approve every parole decision has resulted in 
no juvenile “lifers” receiving parole. Md. Code Ann., 
Corr. Serv. § 7-301(d)(4) (2016). After leaving office, 
Maryland Governor Glendening who had declared that 
“life means life” admitted that “his position had more 
to do with politics than public safety.”8 A lawsuit re-
cently filed there alleges that “no juvenile lifer in the 
state has been paroled in the past two decades.”9 These 
three states, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, 
along with Missouri, account for over two hundred life 
 
 8 Dan Rodricks, Hogan Should Review Parole Cases Rejected 
by O’Malley, Balt. Sun (June 21, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun. 
com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/bs-md-rodricks-0622-2016 
0621-column.html. 
 9 Alison Knezevich, Maryland Parole Commission Says It 
Will Hold Hearings for Hundreds of Juvenile Lifers, Balt. Sun 
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/ 
crime/bs-md-parole-commission-juveniles-20161014-story.html.  
Parole grant rates for North Carolina inmates with no release 
date or serving a life sentence are similarly abysmal. Hayden, 134 
F. Supp. at 1005.  
13 
 
without parole sentences imposed on juvenile offend-
ers.10 
 Though data on juvenile release rates in Missouri 
are harder to obtain, research conducted by The Sen-
tencing Project shows that parole grant rates for Mis-
souri inmates serving a life sentence are as low as 1.8 
percent. Life sentenced inmates are also more than 
four-fold less likely than other parole-eligible inmates 
to be granted parole. This abysmal grant rate is a pre-
dictable result of lack of process and distinguishes Mis-
souri from the process in other states.11 Missouri’s 
existing parole process will not provide Mr. Williams 
with a meaningful opportunity for release. 
 
A. Missouri’s Parole Board Exemplifies 
the Danger of Having Political Deci-
sion Makers with Functionally Unlim-
ited Discretion.  
 Shortly after this Court decided Montgomery, the 
Missouri legislature amended its parole statute to al-
low an inmate who has served 25 years of a juvenile 
 
 10 John Mills, et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and 
Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 535, 603-04 (2016) (listing 222 inmates serving such sen-
tences in these four states as of July 2015).  
 11 In Montgomery, the Court noted that Wyoming provided a 
parole process that would meet Miller’s mandates. Montgomery, 
136 S. Ct. at 736. However the parole process functions in Wyo-
ming, the process in Missouri and a handful of other states 
demonstrates the need for this Court to weigh in directly on Mis-
souri’s process and clarify its dicta in Montgomery.   
14 
 
sentence to “submit to the parole board a petition for 
review of his or her sentence.” Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 558.047.1(1). Missouri’s process does not provide a 
petitioner with a right to counsel, access to the basis 
for the board’s decision, the ability to present or cross-
examine witnesses, or judicial review of the determi-
nation.  
 Missouri’s Parole Board is notorious for operating 
under a “high level of secrecy.”12 Its former operations 
manager of 30 years characterized it as “[c]losed to the 
extreme” and “paranoid closed.”13  
 The members of the Missouri Parole Board are po-
litical appointees and members of the executive 
branch. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.665. The hearings are con-
ducted by a three-person hearing panel consisting of a 
single board member and two “hearing officers” ap-
pointed by the board. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.670(2). All 
members of the panel are members of the executive 
 
 12 David Lieb, Missouri Parole Board Works Under Shroud of 




 13 Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in 






branch, the branch responsible for carrying out the in-
mate’s punishment.14  
 Members of the parole board are not required to 
ever meet with an inmate in person. Hearings may be, 
and frequently are, conducted remotely via videocon-
ference at the board’s discretion, unless the inmate 
knows to lodge an objection to this process. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 217.670(6). Parole hearings are closed to the 
public, and neither the public, the offender, nor the of-
fender’s representative are entitled to a record of the 
proceedings or any other substantive information re-
lated to the board’s decision-making process. Mo. Code 
Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-2.010(5)(E), (F). Missouri’s pa-
role process and outcomes do not provide a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release. 
 
B. Missouri’s Parole Process Exemplifies 
the Handful of Outlier Jurisdictions 
with Very Limited Procedural Guaran-
tees in the Parole Process.  
 Although statutory changes in response to Miller 
require the board to consider the youth of the offender 
 
 14 When Florida attempted to give sole authority for a com-
petency determination to the executive branch, this Court de-
clared such an arrangement to be impermissible, noting that in 
“no other circumstance of which we are aware is the vindication 
of a constitutional right entrusted to the unreviewable discretion 
of an administrative tribunal.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
416 (1986). At a minimum, an inmate should be provided with an 
impartial decision maker, someone outside of the entity charged 
with punishing him. See id. 
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when making a parole decision, those changes do noth-
ing to alter the inadequate procedures that guide the 
board’s decision-making process.  
 Offenders are permitted to have a single repre-
sentative accompany them at the hearing who “may of-
fer a statement on behalf of the offender, ask questions 
and provide any additional information that may be 
requested by the hearing panel.” Mo. Code Regs. Ann. 
tit. 14, § 80-2.010(5)(A)(1). The “representative” need 
not be a lawyer, and in any case, an indigent inmate is 
not entitled to appointed counsel. Id.  
 The lack of right to counsel before the board leaves 
the petitioner at a significant disadvantage in creating 
the record and advocating for release.15 Rather than 
 
 15 Missouri’s process makes no effort to comply with this 
Court’s command to provide counsel where the evidence involved 
is “complex or likewise difficult to develop or present” and related 
to a conditional liberty interest. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
791 (1973). And Missouri’s process does not recognize that juve-
nile offenders face unique challenges that heighten the need for 
counsel. Most juvenile offenders have had limited education prior 
to incarceration, and many have been victims of trauma or suffer 
from mental illness. See Russell, supra, at 434. They have limited 
access to their case in mitigation and are unlikely to be able to 
independently develop and present a plausible release plan, given 
their utter lack of experience living in the adult world. Id. at 421, 
434.  
 As other states have acknowledged, access to counsel is an 
important aspect of affording juvenile offenders a meaningful op-
portunity to make their case for release. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code 
§ 3041.7 (providing counsel in parole hearings for juvenile offend-
ers serving life sentences); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(f)(3) (juve-
niles facing lengthy sentences entitled to counsel in parole 
hearing); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 27  
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having a counseled argument before the board, the pe-
titioner meets with an Institutional Parole Officer be-
fore the hearing who prepares a report to submit to the 
board. Missouri Department of Probation and Parole, 
Procedures Governing the Granting of Paroles and 
Conditional Releases 5 (2009) (hereinafter Blue Book). 
The report “may include” information from the in-
mate’s case, including “social history; medical, psycho-
logical and psychiatric reports; circumstances of any 
prior criminal history including arrests, convictions 
and incarcerations; past and present patterns of be-
havior and confidential information.” Id. at 4. 
 An inmate is not entitled to have witnesses testify 
on his or her behalf. See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 80-2.010(3)(A)(1)-(6). This limitation fails to comply 
with the long acknowledged reality that “[t]he right to 
offer the testimony of witnesses” is necessary to help 
decision-makers determine “where the truth lies,” and, 
as such, “is a fundamental element of due process of 
law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
 While an inmate may present information relating 
to the mitigating aspects of youth as outlined in Mil-
ler,16 the board retains broad leeway to “limit” or “ex-
clude” consideration of anything that it considers 
 
N.E.3d 349, 367 (Mass. 2015) (holding that a “meaningful oppor-
tunity to obtain release” includes provision of counsel and expert 
services to indigent juveniles). 
 16 This includes “their own versions of the present offense,” 
any prior criminal history, “reasons why they think they should 
be paroled,” and any plans they have made in case of release. Mo. 
Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-2.010(3)(A)(1)-(5).  
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irrelevant. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-
2.010(5)(D). This broad discretion, together with no 
record of the proceeding,17 make it impossible to estab-
lish whether the board has meaningfully provided the 
inmate with an opportunity to present a case for re-
lease. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 
479, 496 (1991) (“the lack of recordings or transcripts 
. . . and the inadequate opportunity for SAW appli-
cants to call witnesses or present other evidence . . . 
[forecloses a] meaningful basis upon which to review 
application decisions.”).18 
 In contrast, victims and representatives of the 
State are given wide latitude to make their own 
presentations to the board. Victims and their repre-
sentatives, judges, prosecuting attorneys, and law en-
forcement officials may present information 
“regarding the offense and its impact” and offer their 
opinions about whether the offender should be re-
leased “with or without the offender present.” This is a 
process wholly lacking in adversarial testing. Polk Cty. 
 
 17 “The hearing shall not be open to the public and the rec-
ords of all hearings shall be treated as confidential and shall not 
be opened to inspection by the offender concerned, the offender’s 
representative or any other unauthorized persons.” Mo. Code 
Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-2.010(5)(F). 
 18 Further, the hearings are generally very brief, calling into 
question the meaningfulness of the resulting decision. One attor-
ney who had participated in approximately twenty parole hear-
ings noted he had “never been to one that lasted more than 20 
minutes.” Steve Pokin, What Happens at a Parole Hearing?, 





v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“[Our legal] system 
assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately ad-
vance the public interest in truth and fairness.”).  
 Although inmates are statutorily afforded an  
opportunity to “challeng[e] allegations of fact they per-
ceive to be false,” Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-
2.010(3)(6), without access to either the basis for the 
board’s decision or counsel, this limited right is illu-
sory. Without such an opportunity, the process fails to 
provide the inmate with any meaningful right to con-
front the evidence being used to justify his sentence. 
One “immutable principle” of our criminal justice pro-
cess is that where governmental action may seriously 
harm an individual and “the reasonableness of the ac-
tion depends on fact findings, the evidence used to 
prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the 
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that 
it is untrue.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 
(1959). Here, there is no pretense of compliance with 
this bedrock principle.19  
 Finally, the board has unbridled discretion to deny 
parole, and its decisions are isolated from judicial  
 
 19 Evidence of the Kafkaesque challenges this arrangement 
poses abounds. For example, one stunned Missouri inmate was 
informed by a panel member that the member thought the inmate 
had “been involved in other murders [he had not] been caught for” 
and that there were “things in [his] file I know about [that] you 
don’t know. When asked for further information, the board simply 
replied that “[s]everal statutes prohibit release of this infor-
mation.” See Schwartzapfel, supra.  
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review. Although the parole board has published guide-
lines on its process and for determining release dates, 
the board is not bound to follow them. See Mo. Code 
Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-2.020(1), (4)(A); Blackburn v. 
Mo. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 83 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding that board’s failure to follow its 
own guidelines was not unlawful because the board is 
vested with “wide discretion” to adopt, implement, and 
follow “its own rules and regulations.”). In essence, the 
board is free to make its decisions by whatever means 
and for whatever reason it sees fit.20  
 The only review available is to appeal the decision 
of the hearing panel to the board. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 217.670(2); Blue Book at 9. The “appeal” does not in-
volve any submission or further input from the inmate, 
does not result in any written decision, and “shall be 
final.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.670(2).  
 
 20 The decision to grant or deny parole is made by a majority 
vote among three panel hearing members, only one of whom is a 
member of the board. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.670(2). If the panel en-
ters a decision adverse to the inmate, it must provide a reason for 
doing so. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-2.010(6)(B); Blue Book 
at 8. Although any reason will suffice, one of the two most com-
monly used reasons is that release “at this time would depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense committed or promote disrespect for 
the law.” Blue Book at 8-9. The other most commonly given reason 
is that “there does not appear to be a reasonable probability at 
this time that the offender would live and remain at liberty with-
out violating the law.” Id. This decision is fundamentally at odds 
with “Miller’s central intuition – that children who commit even 




 The Court should either grant review to clarify the 
scope of the requirement for states to provide a mean-
ingful opportunity to obtain release or grant, vacate, 
and remand this case with instructions to the Missouri 
courts to squarely address the question in the first in-
stance. A handful of other states share Missouri’s reti-
cence to meaningfully comply with this Court’s 
mandates, further precipitating the need for this 
Court’s intervention and acceptance of review. 
 
C. Although Most States Have Sought to 
Rigorously Enforce this Court’s Man-
dates in Juvenile Sentencing, Missouri 
Exemplifies a Handful of Outliers that 
Warrant this Court’s Review. 
 In Montgomery, the Court reiterated Miller’s in-
sight that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate 
sentence for all but the rarest of children.” Montgom-
ery, 136 S. Ct. at 726. Since Miller, there has been a 
dramatic shift away from sentencing juveniles to a life-
time in prison, with 3.33 states per year, on average, 
abandoning the punishment, a much higher rate than 
other later invalidated sentencing practices. Mills, su-
pra, at 556. No state has chosen to initiate its use of 
the punishment, and no state has expanded its appli-
cation. Id. Among those retaining the punishment, a 
handful of counties are responsible for ten percent of 
all such sentences nationwide. Id. at 572. States are 
rapidly abandoning the practice of sentencing juve-
niles to a lifetime in prison in law and practice.  
22 
 
 The parole processes adopted after Miller have 
also reflected this shift. In Delaware, juvenile offend-
ers receive judicial review of their sentence for poten-
tial modification. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4217(f ) as 
amended by S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Del. 2013). Massachusetts provides juveniles serving 
the state’s longest sentences with counsel at the initial 
parole hearing (after serving 15 years); to move the 
court for funds to retain expert witnesses; and to seek 
judicial review. Diatchenko, 27 N.E.3d at 365, 367; see 
also Cal. Penal Code § 3041.7 (providing counsel in pa-
role hearings for juvenile offenders serving life sen-
tences); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(f )(3) (juveniles 
facing lengthy sentences entitled to counsel in parole 
hearing). States have, by and large, taken Miller’s 
mandates to heart. However, some states are seeking 
to side-step the Court’s mandates, putting scores of ju-
veniles at risk of suffering a lifetime serving a dispro-
portionate sentence. 
 This case warrants certiorari not only for judicial 
efficiency, but more fundamentally to ensure that 
youth offenders’ hopes of release manifest in a manner 
consistent with Miller’s pronouncement that “children 
are constitutionally different than adults,” 132 S. Ct. 
at 2464. A meaningful opportunity for release should 
mean that children have a realistic hope for release, 
rather than only the remotest possibility of release 
pursuant to a deeply flawed parole process. False hope 
is crueler than no hope. 





 Amici submit that this Court should grant review 
to hear Mr. Williams’s case. In the alternative, they re-
quest that the Court grant review, vacate the decision 
of the Missouri Supreme Court, and remand for a de-
termination of whether Missouri’s parole process pro-
vides a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 
 Respectfully submitted, 
BRADLEY M. BAKKER 
Counsel of Record 
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP 
7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800  
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